We investigate the value creation or destruction associated with the introduction of software patents in the United States in two ways. The first looks at the cumulative abnormal returns to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) firms around the time of important court decisions that impacted software patents, and the second analyzes the relationship between firms' stock market value, the sector in which they operate, and their holdings of software patents. We find that the extension of patentability to software was initially negative for software firms, especially for those producing application software or services. However, we also find that the ownership of software patents is positively and significantly associated with Tobin's Q, and that the market's valuation of software patents increased following changes in the USPTO's treatment of software patents in 1995.
Introduction
Ever since software became generally patentable in the United States in 1995, the wisdom of such a change has been widely debated. Proponents of the change argue that there is no statutory reason to exclude software (or computer-implemented) inventions from patentability, and also that patenting software has social benefits from disclosure and from the fact that it enables software components to be reused by others (Cohen and Lemley 2001) . Critics, who are numerous, base their arguments on a series of considerations: that such patents have often been of low quality, that they discourage rather than encourage innovation, and that they have a negative effect on the growing open source model of innovation (Kasdan 1994; Barton 2000 Barton , 2002 Hunt 2001; Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002; Lunney 2001; Dreyfuss 2000 Dreyfuss , 2001 Meurer 2002) . In a recent article in PC magazine, the columnist John Dvorak argued that software patenting is even bad for Microsoft, the largest patent holder among the pure software firms (Dvorak 2005) . In Europe, patentability of software is still being debated, with no clear conclusion emerging (Blind et al. 2001; European Commission 2002; Spindler 2003) .
The economic view of the patent system sees this debate as an inevitable one, given the nature of patents: with a patent grant we trade off short term exclusive (monopoly) rights to the use of an invention in return for two things: 1) an incentive to create the innovation; and 2) early publication of information about the innovation and its enablement. The argument is that without the patent system, fewer innovations would be produced, and those that were produced would be kept secret as much as possible to protect their returns from appropriation by others. In considering the economic impacts of a subject matter extension to software and business methods, the tradeoff between these benefits and the welfare cost of the grant of a monopoly right are at least as important as they are in any other technological arena.
Recent analysis also says that although competition may suffer when we grant a monopoly right to an inventor, it will benefit if this right facilitates entry into the industry by new and innovative firms (Hall 2003) 3 . Second, innovation will benefit from the incentive created by a patent but may suffer if patents discourage the combining and recombining of inventions to make new products and processes (Scotchmer 1991 (Scotchmer , 1996  Heller and Eisenberg 1998). There are several reasons to think that facilitating entry (the benefit of patents for competition) and discouraging recombination of elements (the cost of patents for innovation) may be particularly salient factors when considering the effects of patentability on the software industry. The software sector is characterized by low tangible assets and high intangible assets, which means that it is more important to have intellectual property rights in order to secure funding for investment. Software itself is typically cumulative and composed of a number of components which may come from a number of different sources, and where interoperability standards are important. Both factors mean that combination and recombination of inputs is an essential part of software creation.
Evaluating the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of the introduction of software patents is a formidable, perhaps impossible, task. It is not made easier by the fact that the most important expansion of software patentability occurred in 1994-1995, exactly coincident with the internet revolution and the beginnings of its impact on the global economy's use of software for a wide range of new applications. 4 To evaluate the impact of software patentability properly would require an examination of a counterfactual world without software patents and measurement of the differential impact on welfare and innovative activity in existing firms, new entrants, downstream buyers, and consumers. In this paper we look at one ingredient of the overall problem: the private returns to established computer hardware and software firms from the expansion of software patentability. If these are not significantly positive, it is difficult to see how software patents could be beneficial for the economy on net. On the other hand, a finding that existing firms benefit financially from the introduction of software patents does not imply that the overall effect is benign. 4 It is possible that this timing is not a coincidence. The expansion of patentability has often come about as a result of the expansion of economic activity in a particular area. E.g., see Murmann (2003) on the chemical industry in Germany and Britain in the late 19 th century. However the rapidity with which attempts to patent software followed on the introduction of the internet makes the causal explanation improbable. It seems more likely that the changes in software patenting in the mid-nineties were driven by the introduction of the personal computer in the mid-eighties and the consequential increased importance of stand-alone software firms.
Existing research on software patents reveals a dramatic increase in the propensity to patent software over the last two decades, and argues that this indicates that holding patents on software has become both easier and more valuable to firms (Bessen and Hunt 2003) . In this paper we explore the relationship between firm value and the patenting of software in two different ways. First we conduct a series of event studies that look at the immediate market impact of changes in the patentability of software on firms in sectors where software patenting is prevalent.
5 Second, we use the methodology of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) to estimate the market value of software patents using various patent-related measures and we explore the effect of changes in the patentability of software over time on the market value of publicly traded firms that hold such patents.
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In performing these analyses, we separate the software firms in the sample into those that are "upstream" and those that are "downstream," which corresponds to the position of their products in the computing stack, from the basic operating system layer to end user application software products (Raduchel 2006) . We hypothesize that firms producing software that relies on hardware or software that is upstream from their software in order to operate may face more negative consequences than other firms from 5 Based on a review of the industry sectors where firms obtain software patents described later in the paper, we identified the relevant two-digit industries as 35 (machinery including computing equipment), 36 (electrical machinery, 38 (instruments), 48 (telecommunications), and 73 (business services including software).
7 Noel and Schankerman (2006) perform a similar analysis of the market value effects of software patents, and obtain conclusions similar to ours. They also study the relationship between market value and measures of the cost of transacting with rival patenters, and conclude that market value is enhanced when rivals' intellectual property is concentrated among fewer parties. the introduction of software patents (at least initially), because they are more likely to need licenses for patented software technology in order to ensure that their products will operate successfully in a particular computer environment.
The paper is organized in the following way: the next section reviews the recent history of software patenting in the United States. This is followed by a discussion of our data, which consists of a panel of publicly traded firms in the ICT sector; we also spend some time evaluating a number of definitions of "software" patents that are based on keyword searches and patent classification systems. The next two sections present our empirical results: first a series of studies of the immediate stock market impact of software patentability decisions in the courts, and then the results for the relationship between firm market value and the ownership of patents. The latter results are presented for two subperiods, before and after the general acceptance of software patenting by the USPTO guidelines. The final section concludes.
Background
The law concerning the patentability of software in the United States has evolved through a series of decisions following the passage of the 1952 Patent Act (which did not exclude any subject matter statutorily), to the point where algorithms may be patented if "there is practical application for the algorithm or if it is associated with a tangible medium (Sterne and Bugaisky 2004, p. 221) . Although a complete history of the use of intellectual property protection in the software industry is beyond the scope of this paper, we provide a brief summary here and refer the reader to Graham and Mowery (2003) for more detail.
In 1972, the Supreme Court's ruling in Gottschalk v. Benson held that because software is essentially a collection of algorithms, it could not be patented. In 1980,
Congress confirmed that the appropriate intellectual property protection for software was copyright (Samuelson 1984 Trademark Office (USPTO) to modify its position with respect to software patents, ultimately to one that allowed them even when not embodied in a physical process. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the growth of software patenting increased from a 5-10 per cent level prior to 1981 to a 15 per cent level afterwards, and then increased again in the mid1990s, as the internet boom took off and the USPTO issued new guidelines for software patenting. 9 The European Patent Convention's (EPC) treatment of patentable subject matter differs markedly from that of the United States Patent Act. Whereas in the US, the 1952 Patent Act opened the door to judicial expansions of patentable subject matter by not including any explicit limits on statutory subject matter, Article 52 of the EPC expressly excludes several categories of inventions, among them mathematical methods, schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers "to the extent to which a European patent application or European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such" (EPO 1989, emphasis added) . In the case of software, the phrase "as such" has led to a number of software inventions actually being patented via their embodiment in hardware. See Bakels (2005) for a detailed discussion of the evolution of European policy in this area.
There matters rested until the early 1990s when the rise of the personal computer industry and the consequent vertical disintegration of the computing sector encouraged software and information producers to test the subject matter exclusions with respect to software again. In 1993 Compton Encyclopedia attempted to enforce a broad patent on the display of multi-media content on CD-ROMs against several firms; in response to complaints by these firms, the USPTO re-examined and revoked the patent in March 1994, which halted assertion of this particular software patent.
But then later in 1994 an important change occurred when the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit (CAFC) stated (In re Alappat) that unpatentable software was that which represented "a disembodied mathematical concept…which in essence represents nothing more than a 'law of nature,' 'natural phenomenon,' or 'abstract idea.'" Software that could be patented was "rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and Court decision stated clearly that Section 101 (the section of the patent code that deals with subject matter for patentability) is unambiguous -"any" means ALL, and it is improper to read limitations into 101 not intended by Congress. Therefore, mathematical algorithms are non-statutory only when "disembodied" and thus lacking a useful application. The court went on to make sure that the decision was precedent-setting by stating that with regard to the business method exception, "We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest."
This decision was followed by an increase in applications for "business method"
patents, most of which are arguably also software patents, because they describe the implementation of a business method on a computer or the internet. However, they are still a small fraction of all software patents (Hall 2003) , at least when we use the relevant patent class (705) to define them. Most of the analysis in this paper uses data that ends in 1999 or earlier, so these patents will play a relatively small role.
2.1
The critique of software patentability
Much of the critique of software patents centers on the perception that such patents are often of low quality, rather than the principle that software should never be patentable. The "quality" of a patent is a somewhat ill-defined catchall term for all the characteristics that the particular analyst would like patents to have. Hall (2003) The examiner: "The problem with obviousness is evidence. When an examiner uses common sense, attorneys scream hindsight. Also, a problem with ordering non-patent publications or translations of foreign documents is the time it takes to process these requests. An examiner cannot simply call a company whose making, or is believed to have made, a product which appears to infringe on a claim. At best, the examiner could ask a librarian at our library to call a company to request info, but again that takes time. With ten hours to do a case, movement is paramount."
Aharonian: "Additionally for subjects like software, the cost of purchasing copies of technical papers would exceed the application fee, so I doubt many examiners would get the authority to spend such sums. Since for most software patent applications, the most relevant prior art is nonpatent materials, between the statistics I cited on citing prior non-patent prior art (an average of two out of about 30) plus the above and below comments, one could make a good case that it is impossible for the PTO to conduct adequate novelty analyses."
The result of lack of access to adequate prior art was that many poor quality software patents were issued (Barton 2001; Kasdan 1994 Kasdan , 1999 Lunney 2001 ).
Second, this sector is an extreme case of cumulative innovation, where one person's invention depends on those of many other people and the transactions costs associated with licensing a large number of patents for any particular software product may exceed the profits attainable from its creation and therefore discourage innovation altogether. Third, some claim that the disclosure function of patents is particularly badly served by software patents, which rarely include the source code implementation and are often quite vaguely and broadly worded. Even in the case of patents in general, both Cohen et al. (2002) (using US survey data) and Arundel et al. (2002) (using European survey data) report that firms rank a number of other means of acquiring information such as customers, exhibits, conferences, journals, suppliers, competitors, and nonprofit institutions ahead of patent disclosures as technical information sources. Furthermore, in contrast to other industries, it has been argued that patents on software do not generally serve to diffuse information about the patented technology. Mann (2004) states that:
"It is clear that [disclosure] is an important benefit of patents in some industries, although the software industry in its current form is probably not one of them…As others have noted, with software cases the Federal Circuit has interpreted the disclosure requirement in such a way as to minimize the likelihood that disclosures will require information that is directly useful to competing inventors. Moreover, given the rapid pace of innovation, it will not often be the case that information disclosure in a patent application filed years earlier will be of immediate value to competitors in the industry." 
Data
To perform our study, we combine data on publicly Table 2 contains summary statistics for the dataset. In order to identify the particular software area in which our firms operate, we have also incorporated information from the Corptech directory of technology companies on the type of software they produce (systems software, middleware, applications, or software-related services).
19 17 The update is available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall 18 Details on the matching algorithm can be found at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/pat/namematch/namematch.html 19 We gather this information from Corptech's SOF product codes and the classification developed in Gao (2005) , which is listed in the appendix to this paper.
Defining a software patent
One difficulty that all researchers in this area encounter is that the definition of a software patent is rather unclear (Layne-Farrar 2005) . Many scholars in the area may feel that "we know one when we see one" but this is not a practical way to choose a particular set of patents out of the 3 million or so in our datasets. Although all patents are classified into a number of technology classes and simply choosing those patents that are associated with software classes might seem the desirable way to go, it is an unfortunate truth that many of the relevant classes are broad enough to contain both software and hardware patents, and some software patents end up classified in classes that do not appear to have anything to do with software at first glance. 20 For this reason, different researchers have taken a number of approaches to identify software patents. In early versions of this paper,
we explored the use of several different definitions and finally settled on a combination of them.
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The results reported in the body of the paper were obtained using a definition of a software patent that combined three ways of defining software patents. The three definitions are that used by Graham and Mowery (2003) , that used by Bessen and Hunt (2003) , and one that we constructed based on the patent classes and subclasses that contain patents assigned to fifteen of the largest software firms (which we call HallMacGarvie). Our combined definition was the union of the set of patents in all relevant 20 The four US patent classes with the largest number of patents assigned to our software firms are 382 (Image Analysis), 345 (Selective Visual Display Systems), 341 (Coded Data Generation or Conversion), and 700 (Data Processing: Generic Control Systems or Specific Applications), all of which can hold hardware as well as software applications. On the other hand, there are over 1000 such patents in 435 (Molecular Biology) and over 500 in 84 (Music).
IPC and US patent classes (the union of Graham-Mowery and Hall-MacGarvie) intersected with the set of patents found using a keyword search of title and abstract (Bessen-Hunt) .
As a check, we compare the results of these automated classification systems with the sample of software and internet business method patents identified manually by John
Allison via a reading of the claims and description in the patents (Allison and Lemley 2000; Allison and Tiller 2003) . In the remainder of this section of the paper, we describe the definitions more fully and present some comparative statistics based on them.
Graham and Mowery (henceforth GM) identify as software patents those that fall in certain International Patent Classification (IPC) class/subclass/groups. Broadly defined, the class/subclasses are "Electric Digital Data Processing" (G06F), "Recognition of Data; Presentation of Data; Record Carriers; Handling Record Carriers" (G06K), and "Electric Communication Technique" (H04L). 22 Graham and Mowery selected these classes after examining the patents of the six largest producers of software in the U.S.
(based on 1995 revenues) between 1984 and 1995. Patents in these classes account for 57% of the patents assigned to the hundred largest firms in the software industry. 23 Bessen and Hunt (henceforth BH) define software patents as those that include the word "software," or the words "computer" and "program," in the description and/or specification. Patents that meet these criteria and also contain the words "semiconductor," "chip," "circuit," "circuitry" or "bus" in the title are excluded, as they 22 The groups included are G06F: 3,5,7,9,11,12,13,15; G06K: 9,15 ; H04L: 9. 23 Graham and Mowery, p. 232. The firms are Microsoft, Adobe, Novell, Autodesk, Intuit, and Symantec.
are believed to refer to the technology used to execute software rather than the software itself. 24 Patents containing "antigen", "antigenic", or "chromatography" in the description/specification are also excluded. As a check of the accuracy of these various definitions, we used a sample of manually identified software and business method patents compiled by John Allison.
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Using a sample of 1000 patents issued between 1996 and 1998, Allison and Lemley (2000) identified 100 software patents by reading the claims and descriptions. Allison and Tiller (2003) augmented this sample with 230 internet business method patents, most of which are arguably members of the class of software patents. Table 1 shows the results of comparing this list with the patents selected by the three definitions, Bessen-Hunt, 24 Bessen and Hunt, p. 4. 25 One complication in using the U.S. patent classification system is that patents are continually reclassified as new classes are opened up. Software has been particularly subject to this reclassification, because there were no specific software classes until the "700" classes were created after the issuance of the USPTO guidelines in 1996. We are using the 2002 classification of all the patents in our dataset, which is late enough so that software should be correctly classified.
Graham-Mowery, and Hall-MacGarvie. From this procedure we can learn whether our samples include patents identified by Allison, although we are unable to ascertain how many patents in our sample would not have been labeled software by his procedure. That is, we can measure Type I error (missing a software patent we should have identified) but not Type II error (calling a patent a software patent when it is not).
The results are fairly clear: the keyword method of Bessen and Hunt is much more accurate in the sense of avoiding Type I error than either the International Patent Classification (IPC)-based classification or the US patent class-based classification, either of which identify only about half of these patents. Interestingly, Graham-Mowery is better at identifying software patents, whereas Hall-MacGarvie is much better at internet business method patents. This is probably because the US patent class system explicitly admits the existence of such patents, while the IPC does not, so they may end up classified in a wide range of IPC classes. Layne-Farrar (2005) describes an attempt to determine the Type II error in these different definitions of software patents. She reports that when software experts read a random sample of patents from each dataset to see if they were truly for software, they classified about 5 per cent of the patents held by packaged software firms in the GrahamMowery and Allison-Tiller sets as not software.
28 Layne-Farrar finds that a larger proportion of the Bessen-Hunt sample were classified as not relating to software, which would suggest that using only this definition is problematic. However, since the latter sample (BH) includes patents held by firms across all industries, the results of the comparison between the three samples are somewhat difficult to interpret.
However, because the GM definition does well on Type II error, and because GM and HM seem to select different groups of patents, whereas BH seems to be more comprehensive (better at Type I error), our preferred definition of software patents combines these definitions in the following way: we take the union of the GM and HM samples, and then intersect this with the BH sample. On the assumption that the HM US class/subclass approach does something similar to the GM IPC class/subclass approach, this intersects a sample that should have approximately 5% type II error (that is, it rarely misidentifies patents as software that are not software) with an inclusive sample that covers almost all software patents plus many other computing patents. The result is shown in the final row of Table 1 : our new definition captures over 80 per cent of the patents identified by Allison as software and internet patents, but not at the cost of being too inclusive. We therefore chose to use this combined definition as our preferred sample of software patents, and to present results using the other definitions in an appendix.
Figures 1 and 2 show the trends in software patent growth using the four definitions described above plus an aggregate software patenting series supplied by Aharonian (2001) in his email newsletter. 29 Figure 1 shows the absolute numbers and Figure 2 shows the share of software patents among all granted patents. The Aharonian definition appears to track that from the Bessen-Hunt keyword definition more closely than the others, whereas our combined definition is conservative and lies somewhere 29 Greg Aharonian is a patent agent specializing in Information Technology sector patenting who has been tracking software patents using his own subjective evaluation of subject matter for some time. We include his figures to give some idea of the view of an observer familiar with the sector and its patenting. between the two patent class definitions (those using IPC and US patent classes). Using any of the definitions, there is substantial growth since 1976 that accelerates in around 1995-1996. The apparent jump from 1997 to 1998 using any of the definitions results from a jump in applications three years earlier, that is presumably due to the series of court decisions that are described in the next section of the paper.
Event studies
As discussed earlier, in 1994 and 1995, Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 Beauregard, 53 F.3d (1995 . In response to the confusion created by the court's determination that much of software was patentable, the USPTO proposed new guidelines for software patentability on May 12, 1995, and published these guidelines on March 29, 1996. In this section of the paper, we describe the decisions and then present the results of several studies of the effects of the decisions on the value of firms in the software industry or holding software patents. Table 3 presents a timeline for the decisions we consider, with the abnormal returns experienced by our firms around the date of each decision (these results are discussed in section 4.1)
In re Alappat
In 1988, Alappat filed an application for a patent on a means of smoothing the appearance of a waveform displayed by a digital oscilloscope. The PTO rejected the application's claims as non-patentable subject matter. Alappat appealed the decision to 
In re Warmerdam
The Alappat decision was followed on August 11, 1994 by In re Warmerdam, partly affirming and partly reversing the decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals, which had upheld the PTO's rejection of an invention as non-patentable subject matter. The CAFC ruled that the invention, a mechanism for generating data structures for collision avoidance systems, was "nothing more than the manipulation of basic mathematical constructs, the paradigmatic 'abstract idea.'" 32 However, the court held that a machine containing in memory the data structure created by the mechanism would indeed be patentable (Huttner and Strobert 1995) . Warmerdam was followed on August 26, 1994 by In re Lowry, which reversed the PTO's rejection of an application on the grounds that a data structure held in memory was unpatentable under the "printed matter" doctrine. The "printed matter" doctrine provides that "an article of manufacture which consists of printed matter on a substrate cannot be statutory if it differs from other substrates only by the informational content of the printed matter except where there is some functional interaction between the printed matter and the substrate." 34 In this instance, the PTO had held that Lowry had not shown that the data structures were functionally related to the memory in which they were stored, but the CAFC ruled that the printed matter doctrine did not hold when the information in question was processed by a machine rather than by the human mind..
In re Lowry

In re Trovato and In re Beauregard
In In re Trovato (December 19, 1994) , the CAFC upheld the PTO's rejection of a software patent for containing non-statutory subject matter. The guidelines stated that inventions that were to be considered non-statutory included data compilations or structures independent of physical elements, encoded information representing creative or artistic expression, and processes that do "nothing more than manipulate abstract ideas or concepts." 
Null hypotheses on the effects of the patentability decisions
As stated previously, the expansion of the patentability of software may have had both positive and negative effects. Firms already holding patents at the time of the 37 USPTO guidelines quoted in Huttner and Strobert (1995) .
38 op. cit.
decision may be positively affected due to an increased ability to exclude competitors from a market or collect licensing revenues. We will thus compare the effects of patentability on patent holders and non-patent holders as of the time of the event, with the expectation that the market reaction should be larger for patent holders. Note that another set of firms that may benefit from software patents are start-ups for whom patents may help secure financing. Because we are focusing on the market value of publicly traded firms, we are unable to study this effect.
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We also consider the potential negative effects of the decisions. For all firms, the decisions may have increased costs by creating the need to engage in licensing negotiations and by increasing the potential for hold-up. We hypothesize that the latter effect is especially relevant for firms in "downstream" market segments, i.e., firms producing software that must interact with or operate on top of other software or platforms. We thus test whether the market reacted negatively for firms specializing in applications software and software-related services relative to firms producing for "upstream" segments (middleware, systems software, and hardware). 
4.2
Results of the event studies Table 3 contains the results of the event studies that identify the market's response to each of the above-mentioned decisions, for the entire sample of firms and for software firms only. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) associated with the events, and their standard errors, using the regression approach described by 39 Cockburn and MacGarvie (2006) study the effects of patent "thickets" on entry in narrowlydefined software product areas. 40 See the appendix for our classification of firms into these segments. Salinger (1992) . 41 We regress the stock returns for firms in our sample on the market return (using the CRSP value-weighted market index), and a series of dummies for the days in an event window from one day before to three days after the event in question (t = -1 to t = +3, where t is the date of the event). Our pre-event estimation window runs from t-90 days to t-30 days.
For each event we show the average CAR for all firms, for software firms only (firms whose primary SIC code is 73XX), and for firms specializing in applications software or software-related services, as defined by the Corptech directory. 42 We also include rank sum tests of the difference in the CAR distribution between the latter group and other firms, and those firms that do and do not hold software patents (according to the combined definition) at the time of the event. We group the CARs in this way because we expect the effect of the decisions to differ depending on whether firms can expect to take advantage of the increased strength of software patents. We expect that firms holding software patents at the time of decisions that broaden patentable subject matter to include some types of software will be positively affected relative to firms without patents. We also expect that firms in "downstream" sectors -like applications software and software-related services -will be negatively affected relative to upstream firms in hardware and middleware or systems software, because they may be forced to 41 see p. 41-42. 42 As of the date of our data (2002), Compustat classified IBM into software services. Because of the importance of this firm in software patenting in general and because for most of our time period IBM was primarily a hardware firm, we have reclassified it into computing machinery. However, throughout this paper, we found that estimates with and without including observations on IBM were substantially the same.
license in patented technology in order to ensure that their products will function on top of middleware or the operating systems.
The first event we consider is the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Diehr, followed by the Compton patent grant and subsequent revocation. None of these events are associated with significant abnormal returns, with the exception of the Compton patent assertion, which was slightly negative (significant at the 10 per cent level).
However, according to the rank sum test, the distribution of CARs for firms with no software patents at the time of this event was significantly to the right of that for firms with CARs when the patent was revoked, which suggests that they benefited from the decision, presumably because they would have been disadvantaged if such patents became widespread in the sector.
The In re Alappat decision is widely viewed as the groundbreaking one on software patentability and this is reflected in the abnormal returns at the time of the decision. 43 The software industry in general experienced negative abnormal returns, statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. Firms that specialized in applications software or services saw even more significant negative CARs of over 4 percent on average. 44 This is significantly lower than the CARs for other firms in the industry.
Furthermore, firms without patents also see a significantly negative market reaction relative to firms with patents.
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The next decision, In re Warmerdam, had mixed implications, partly expanding and partly restricting the patentability of software. The market reaction is accordingly mixed, with positive CARs for the industry as a whole, but a significantly negative difference between CARs for firms without and firms with software patents. In re Lowry, a clear expansion of patentability that followed Warmerdam, is associated with negative
CARs for applications/services firms, and slightly negative for software firms in general, whereas In re Trovato had little impact.
The culmination of these decisions was the USPTO's announcement of proposed new guidelines for software patents, which is associated with CARs that are significantly lower for applications/services firms and non-patent holders. The final issuance of the guidelines is associated with yet another negative reaction for applications and services firms. However, there is a puzzling positive reaction for non-patent holders relative to patent holders when the guidelines were first proposed, which may reflect the resolution of uncertainty.
Market value and software patenting
In this section of the paper we employ the Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg (henceforth, HJT 2005) methodology to estimate the contribution of software patents to Tobin's Q. 45 The comparisons of the mean CARs for applications/services firms vs. others, and nonpatenting vs. patenting firms, are performed using a rank sum test, which is a non-parametric alternative to the t-test. 47 We include these interactions to deal with the large increase in valuation for software firms at the end of our sample period, which was presumably due to the dotcom "bubble".
We compare the value of these patents to patents in general, both before and after the changes in software patentability rules in 1995. In order to adjust for differences in the quality of the patents, we perform the same exercise with cite-weighted patents, and with cite-weighted patents excluding self-cites.
The HJT 2005 paper specifies a firm-level market-value equation that is linear and additively separable (following Griliches (1981) ). We follow the HJT paper closely in the ensuing description of the model. The market value of firm i in year t is modeled as:
where A it stands for physical assets, and K it the firm's knowledge assets. Taking logarithms yields the following equation:
Assuming constant returns to scale (that is, σ t = 1) and moving A it to the left hand side,
we can express the model with Tobin's q as the dependent variable:
We specify the knowledge capital K it as a function of the stock R&D spending and the stock of patents, both unweighted and weighted by citations. Given our specific interest in this paper, we further break K down according to whether the patents are in software-related fields. This results in the following estimating equation:
in which RD it is firm i's R&D capital stock in year t, P it is a measure of patent stock in year t, and SP it is a measure of the software patent stock in year t. The coefficient γ 2 measures the impact of patents above and beyond that of the R&D that produces them and γ 3 measures the premium or discount associated with software patents. P and SP are based on patents dated by year of application, citation-weighted patents dated by year of application, or citations excluding self-citations to patents dated by year of application.
A full set of two-digit industry and year dummies for the sample period (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) are also included, and in some cases industry-year interactions. 47 The R&D and patent stock measures are constructed using the usual declining balance method with a depreciation rate of 15 per cent:
, 1
(1 )
where R it is R&D spending, granted patents applied for in year t, or granted software patents applied for in year t. Patents are either simple counts, counts weighted by citations they subsequently received, or counts weighted by citations excluding selfcitations.
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Interpretation of the coefficients in an equation like equation (4) can be difficult, since the variables are in a variety of units (dollars per dollar, counts per dollar, etc.). To enhance comparability, we computed the elasticity of Tobin's Q with respect to each of our variables using the following equation:
48 Our patent data end in 2002 and our regressions in 1999. This means that we have three years to observe the issuance of the youngest patents in the sample, which is enough time to observe most of them. However, it is not sufficient time to observe forward citations for the most recent patents, so we have adjusted the number of citations received by each patent by the ratio of the total number expected to be received by a patent in that technology class to the average number such patents have received by the time of the relevant citation lag, using a methodology described in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001. where j = 1,2,3 and X j it is the corresponding right hand side variable. We then averaged these elasticities across the observations and reported them in the bottom panel of the table.
We estimate equation (4) using nonlinear least squares and report the results in Tables 4. Eicker-White standard errors are computed to ensure robustness to heteroskedasticity. We included a complete set of year dummies for each of the 5 twodigit industries in our sample (machinery, electrical machinery, instruments, telecommunications, and software). Although we were concerned that general trends in the valuation of software firms, especially during the late 1990s, might be contaminating our results, there was in fact almost no difference between the results in Table 4 and those using a single set of year dummies for all of the sectors. There are three sets of columns in the table, one set corresponding to the whole period, one set for the preguidelines period (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) and one for the post-1994 period, in order to focus on the question of whether the value of software patents increased following the Beauregard decision and the Commissioner of Patents' issuance of new guidelines on software patentability in 1995.
The overall results are similar to those in HJT 2005, with R&D having a strong relationship with Tobin's Q, and either patents or citation-weighted patents having a somewhat weaker but still significant relationship in the presence of R&D. The most noteworthy result in the table is that software patents, whether or not they are weighted by forward citations, are valued at a significant premium by the market, relative to ordinary patents, but that this is entirely due to their value following the 1994/1995 changes in software patenting. The average elasticities suggest that doubling the patent yield per R&D dollar increases market value by one per cent before 1995 and two per cent afterwards, whereas if the patents in question were software patents, the numbers would be the same before and 4 per cent after. The results for citation-weighted patents are similar, although the differential boost from patenting in software is slightly lower when the patents are weighted by citations. This suggests that, relative to other patents, owning software patents may be more important than the fact that they are cited.
However we are reluctant to draw strong conclusions from this finding because there has been limited time to observe the citations during the later period.
This table also shows that removing self-citations from the citation weights makes little difference to the overall results for software patents, although it does reduce the impact of cites for non-software patents. That is, self-citations to non-software patents are valued more highly than ordinary citations, as in HJT 2005. The total effect of citations to software patents is also somewhat lower when self-citations are excluded, so the differential is about the same.
In Table 5 we split the sample into software and hardware (machinery, electrical machinery, instruments, and telecommunications) firms and show the results for the same estimation as in Table 4 
Conclusions
We obtain two sets of conclusions based on our two approaches to measuring the private value of software patents. First, we conclude that, as measured by the stock market's reaction to legal decisions expanding the patentability of software, there is no evidence that the expansion of software patentability benefited firms in the software industry. There is limited evidence of relatively negative effects on some types of software producers -applications producers and providers of software-related services, and firms with no patenting experience at the time of the decisions.
Our second approach examines the relationship between Tobin's Q and firms' patent and citation stocks. Surprisingly, software patents seem to be more highly valued by the market than ordinary patents, even in the presence of controls for the overall increase in the market valuation of software firms. However, for hardware producers, this appears to reflect the strategic value of a software patent rather than the technological value of the patented invention (because only patents -not the citations to those patentsare valued by the market). The finding that forward citations to patents held by software firms are positively and significantly valued by the market suggests that these patents do reflect technologically valuable inventions and that the market recognizes this value per se.
Combining these two sets of findings, we conclude that the market evaluated software patents as unimportant ex ante and expected that the expansion of software patentability would negatively affect firms in downstream sectors and firms without patents. Ex post, of course, a greater number of firms in all ICT sectors invested in these patents. In addition, firms in the ICT sector that hold software patents are found to be valued at a significant premium relative to firms without software patents. This story paints a picture of firms adjusting to a new environment and set of rules, which although they were initially perceived as negative for the software sector, have provided some benefits, at least for firms large enough to be publicly traded on the market. Nevertheless we should also emphasize that the majority of the software patents acquired during the past twenty years have been acquired by non-software firms in the ICT sector (in our sample the figure is almost 90 per cent), which suggests that the growth in these patents is driven to a great extent by the needs of hardware firms for large patent portfolios rather than by the needs of software firms to protect their inventions.
Differences between software patent definitions
We consider several different definitions of what constitutes a software patent (see p. 12-17 for a discussion of these definitions). Figures 1 and 2 plot the total number of software patents granted and the number of software patents as a percentage of all patents granted, for each of the alternative definitions. [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] , software patents and forward citations are positively and significantly associated with Tobin's Q across all the definitions. The magnitudes of the elasticities are also comparable across definitions.
However, there are differences between the definitions when we look at nonsoftware firms and when we consider the change in valuation over time. Here, the BH definition diverges from the others, showing a positive and significant valuation of citation-weighted software patents for non-software firms, even in the pre-1994 period, as well as a decrease over time in the elasticity of market value with respect to software patents held by software firms. This may reflect the fact that the BH set of patents appears to contain a considerably greater number of hardware patents, at least according to the sample studied by Layne-Farrar. Communications systems software C.
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